Anchored in Action: Operationalizing NATO’s Climate Security Plan in the Arctic Maritime Domain

Back to Publications

The Arctic maritime domain serves as a critical testbed for operationalizing NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan. Photo: Pxhere.com

The Arctic Institute NATO Series 2024-2025

---

Since 2021 and until recently, NATO has bolstered its commitment to addressing the security implications of climate change, demonstrated by the release of foundational guiding documents,¹⁾NATO (2023) Climate Change and Security Action Plan – Compendium of Best Practice. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/7/pdf/0664-22_Climate_Change_Compendium_-_V3.pdf. Accessed on 1 July 2025 and by the development of specialized capabilities and institutional support to integrate climate considerations into its core missions. NATO’s climate ambitions are specifically enshrined in its Climate Change and Security Action Plan²⁾NATO (2021) Climate Change and Security Action Plan, 14 June. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185174.htm. Accessed on 1 July 2025. along four main pillars: enhancing Allied awareness of the security implications of climate change, advancing climate adaptation across all dimensions of NATO’s work, contributing to mitigating climate change by reducing military emissions, and enhancing outreach and collaboration with other relevant actors. These advancements provide a vital framework for understanding and addressing the complex interplay between climate change and NATO’s strategic and operational environment.

The Arctic, mentioned for the first time as an area of priority for the Alliance in NATO’s Strategic Concept released in June 2022, is one of the regions of the globe most affected by climate change. In addition to posing significant threats to human security, sea ice melting, permafrost thaw, more frequent and severe storms, and other physical phenomena impact NATO’s infrastructure and assets, all subject to logistical stress and extreme-weather events. In addition, climate impacts influence the strategic decision-making of Arctic nations – ultimately altering the broader strategic environment within which NATO operates. Such effects are especially prevalent in the maritime domain, which is particularly vulnerable to climate change and stands as predominant in Arctic security due to both the region’s geography (an ocean surrounded by land) and to the critical role of sea ice in regional dynamics. The Arctic maritime domain hence serves as a critical testbed for operationalizing NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan. This article outlines priorities and practical steps in translating NATO’s climate security policy into action in the Arctic maritime domain, based on three of the Plan’s four main pillars: awareness, adaptation and mitigation.

Awareness: Understanding climate impacts on the Arctic strategic environment

For the past three decades, the Arctic had been widely considered an exception in international relations due to its presumed immunity to external tensions. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, added to other strategic developments that were already unfolding in the Arctic in recent years, recently dramatically contributed to the intensification of tensions and to the growingly competitive rhetoric. Variations in regional political dynamics are furthermore intertwined with climate change, which physical effects are multiplied in the High North.

Interactions between climate change and strategic competition: Myths and realities

Climate change is generally seen as interacting with strategic competition through several dimensions. First, ice melting is expected to progressively open new navigable routes and potential opportunities for exploitation of natural resources. Although much has been written regarding these prospects, their timeline, reliability, as well as their economic and operational viability are essentially uncertain, owing to the region’s particularly challenging navigation conditions, long distances, and sparse infrastructure. However, future economic prospects are already leading to the intensification of efforts to secure and retain control of sea lanes and economic assets for resource exploration. This is especially visible along the Northern Sea Route running along the Russian Arctic — where the Kremlin is studying a toll road plan and has initiated the creation of private military companies³⁾Nilsen A (2023) Arctic oil-driller Gazprom Neft creates its own private military company. The Barents Observer, 8 February, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/arctic-oildriller-gazprom-neft-creates-its-own-private-military-company/165274. Accessed on 1 July 2025. affiliated to the local oil industry, in addition to reopening military facilities and resuming a significant military build-up. Russia’s overall climate vulnerability will likely shape Moscow’s future strategic decision-making, thereby further deteriorating the already unstable strategic environment. For example, increased vulnerability owing to the loss of sea-ice coverage protecting Russian nuclear ballistic submarines (SSBNs)⁴⁾Choi T & Spedding C (2022) Canadian Submarine Recapitalization, The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), 22 November. https://basicint.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/22_66_BASIC_Canadian-Submarine-Recapitalization-within-the-context-of-Climate-Change-report_03.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2025. may translate into a more assertive force posture by Moscow fearing an expansion of NATO’s military presence near its maritime zone. Finally, increased navigation, as well as investment in the extraction of natural resources in the region, can represent a challenge for local communities, as well as a risk of foreign penetration and malicious interference from potential adversaries. Climate change is indeed likely to amplify opportunities⁵⁾Baudu P (2023) Building a safer North: Climate security risks, gaps, and opportunities of the Canadian Arctic, Vanguard, 17 May, https://vanguardcanada.com/building-a-safer-north-climate-security-risks-gaps-and-opportunities-of-the-canadian-arctic/. Accessed on 2 July 2025. for external actors to engage in the Arctic through below-the-threshold operations, blurring the line between legitimate forms of engagement and malign behaviours. Case-in-point for this are the activities carried out by China, whose long-standing Arctic ambitions often clash with the interests of sovereign Arctic countries. Climate change allows China to strengthen its Arctic footprint in several ways, from justifying a deeper scientific presence to monitor climate impacts in strategically-significant locations, to enticing its fishing fleets to enter sovereign Arctic waters and carry out reconnaissance activities,⁶⁾Lajeunesse A (2022), Arctic Perils: Emerging Threats in the Arctic Maritime Environment, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, https://www.cgai.ca/arctic_perils_emerging_threats_in_the_arctic_maritime_environment. Accessed on 3 July 2025. as warming waters are drawing new fish species to the North.

Increasing Allied awareness

The first pillar of NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan sets out the goal of increasing Allied awareness of the security implications of climate change on NATO’s strategic environment and operations. To do so, NATO has pledged to “integrate climate change considerations into security risk and resilience assessments […] in regions of key interest to the Alliance,” by leveraging science and technology to support research. There is a vast toolset of possibilities to build and share awareness, both within the Alliance and with NATO partners, about climate impacts on NATO’s Arctic maritime domain, and overcome the significant gaps in maritime situational awareness in the region. In particular, sharing of, and access to information is key when dealing with climatic predictions and modelling. NATO should capitalize on existing technology and invest in AI-based solutions to integrate climate data together with data on military and security developments in the region, improve early-warning systems, and detect change in real-time. Another important step forward would be mainstreaming the climate factor into NATO wargaming and tabletop exercises. Climate-informed scenarios factoring all aspects of the climate and environmental risks in Arctic seas (from the vulnerability of military installations to risks on local communities) would significantly improve NATO’s risk-assessment and anticipation capabilities, and strengthen its proactive approach. To this end, a good start would be to clearly identify climate change as a risk factor when updating NATO’s wargaming handbook⁷⁾NATO (2023) ACT Wargaming Handbook in order to encourage the integration of climate change across Allied wargaming efforts.

Adapting to climate change

The second pillar of NATO’s Plan is the Alliance’s adaptation to climate change, both at the strategic and operational levels. This means incorporating climate considerations into, and ensuring the climate-resilience of, the Alliance’s capabilities, training, and defence planning.

At the strategic level, priorities for NATO in the Arctic maritime domain⁸⁾Bykova A (2024) NATO has always been an Arctic alliance, The Arctic Institute, May 28, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-alliance-part-i/. Accessed on 4 July 2025. include keeping the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap open for reinforcements in case of conflict in Europe or in the Baltic Sea; ensuring peacetime freedom of navigation for civilian and commercial traffic; and, ensuring the protection of Allies’ maritime territory. To accomplish such tasks in a context where climate change will continue to affect NATO’s readiness, military mobility, and deterrence and defence posture, the Alliance needs both Arctic-capable maritime forces and appropriate naval installations (think deep-sea ports) in strategic positions to ensure logistical support. Moreover, coastal Allies should possess a number of icebreakers adapted to the area of their exclusive economic zones in order to ensure adequate domain awareness, and sufficient radar coverage for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure and for search and rescue operations. Additionally, in building an Arctic-capable force and stepping up exercises and operations, NATO will need to carefully consider the growing risk of incidents and misunderstandings at sea, particularly in light of intensifying maritime traffic and more frequent interactions with Russian ships.

At the operational level, allied maritime forces are already seeing the scope of their missions expanding with climate change (take the increasing need to address concurrent emergencies⁹⁾Baudu P (2023) Building a safer North: Climate security risks, gaps, and opportunities of the Canadian Arctic, Vanguard, 17 May, https://vanguardcanada.com/building-a-safer-north-climate-security-risks-gaps-and-opportunities-of-the-canadian-arctic/. Accessed on 2 July 2025. such as search-and-rescue and disaster response due to intensifying maritime traffic). They also need to adapt to a more challenging operating environment affecting their military readiness. Wave-heights are projected to grow significantly in the coming decades, so are the incidence of new surface and underwater currents, storm strength, and radiation exposure¹⁰⁾Heise R (2021) NATO is responding to new challenges posed by climate change, NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/04/01/nato-is-responding-to-new-challenges-posed-by-climate-change/index.html. Accessed on 3 July 2025. Ships will also navigate foggier seas, and will need to avoid a growing number of icebergs as sea ice melts and disaggregates,¹¹⁾Song et al. (2023) Adapting to a Foggy Future along Trans-Arctic Shipping Routes. Geophysical Research Letters, 50(8 necessitating alterations in coastal navigation routes with potential impacts for military exercises. Accelerating ocean acidification and salinity exacerbate the corrosion of surface ships and, coupled with sea ice loss and ambient noise level, affect sonar performance and submarine detectability.¹²⁾Gilli A et al. (2024) Climate Change and Military Power: Hunting for Submarines in the Warming Ocean. Texas National Security Review 7(2): 16-41 Maritime infrastructure itself (such as ships, ports, dockyards, base housing and offices) is threatened¹³⁾NATO (2024) Climate Change Impact Assessment. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_227571.htm. Accessed on 1 July 2025. by sea-level rise and growing risks of flooding and storms. Naval bases built on permafrost are at high risk of inoperability, and some will need to be restructured or permanently closed. Adaptation of maritime capabilities to climate change should therefore include the proactive modernization and climate-proofing of naval platforms, bases and other military infrastructure at sea, as well as the adaptation of weapon systems to both extreme temperature conditions and rapid temperature changes¹⁴⁾Heise R (2021) NATO is responding to new challenges posed by climate change, NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/04/01/nato-is-responding-to-new-challenges-posed-by-climate-change/index.html. Accessed on 3 July 2025. Priorities should also include adjusting and standardizing training, exercises and procedures (such as in disaster response operations or in ship de-icing), including through partnerships with local communities to amplify traditional expertise on climate change. Arctic training¹⁵⁾Lajeunesse A (2015), The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements, Canadian Global Affairs Institute. https://www.cgai.ca/canadian_armed_forces_in_the_arctic. Accessed on 1 July 2025. of the Canadian Armed Forces, involving expertise and leadership from the local Rangers, are an excellent example of knowledge-sharing to facilitate awareness of and adaptation to the changing operating environment.

Taking part in climate change mitigation

Lastly, the third pillar of the Action Plan announces NATO’s contribution to the mitigation of climate change through the formulation of goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the military. At the Madrid Summit, in 2022, then-Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg specified this commitment¹⁶⁾NATO (2022) Opening speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security, NATO Public Forum, 28 June. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197168.htm. Accessed on 1 August 2025. by announcing NATO’s goal of cutting its civilian and military emissions by at least 45 percent by 2030, and reaching carbon-neutrality by 2050.

The Arctic and its unique ecosystems are some of the most climate-vulnerable on Earth, and world oceans are notoriously at the forefront of climate change and environmental degradation. This makes the case for an extra-focus on the Arctic maritime domain when stepping up NATO’s mitigation efforts.

Naval activities have substantial climate and environmental footprints in the Arctic

The fragile landscapes and unique marine ecosystems of the Arctic are undergoing rapid transformation, marked by shifting distribution in marine species, the loss of species vital to food webs, and alterations in ocean primary production. Ice melting also generates destructive feedback loops, which further aggravate global warming: thawing permafrost releases high amounts of methane¹⁷⁾Bykova A (2020) Permafrost Thaw in a Warming World: The Arctic Institute’s Permafrost Series Fall-Winter 2020, The Arctic Institute, October 1, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/permafrost-thaw-warming-world-arctic-institute-permafrost-series-fall-winter-2020/. Accessed on 1 July 2025. (a more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon), and melting sea ice exposes larger parts of a dark ocean, thereby absorbing more heat. In addition, the region’s marine biodiversity is severely impacted by environmental and noise pollution and by collision hazards from increased shipping. Intensifying human activity in Arctic seas also means higher risks of oil spill (which can persist for weeks or longer in cold waters), release of GHG emissions and air pollutants, and damage to important marine life zones. These impacts are particularly relevant for defence assets in the High North due to higher-than-usual levels of fuel usage for electricity and heating as they operate in remote locations and extreme-cold conditions. The drastic environmental and biodiversity changes in the Arctic also compound human risks as they threaten the health, livelihoods, mobility, and traditional lifestyles of local, mostly indigenous, coastal communities. Finally, the use, storage and disposal of nuclear and nuclear-powered military capabilities in Arctic waters, especially along the Russian coast, pose serious risks of radioactive contamination, which can persist for extended periods, and harms both local wildlife and communities.¹⁸⁾Nilsen A (2023) Arctic oil-driller Gazprom Neft creates its own private military company. The Barents Observer, 8 February, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/arctic-oildriller-gazprom-neft-creates-its-own-private-military-company/165274. Accessed on 1 July 2025.

Science and cooperation to mitigate NATO’s footprint

In this context, NATO, through its new Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) combined with the expertise of its Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE – La Spezia, Italy), can serve as a standard-setting tool and coordination platform to provide guidance for Allies and partners to operate sustainably in the region.¹⁹⁾Baudu P (2023) Building a safer North: Climate security risks, gaps, and opportunities of the Canadian Arctic, Vanguard, 17 May, https://vanguardcanada.com/building-a-safer-north-climate-security-risks-gaps-and-opportunities-of-the-canadian-arctic/. Accessed on 2 July 2025. NATO has the capacity to highlight national practices among Allies to coordinate emissions reporting, building on the standardization efforts initiated through NATO’s GHG Emissions Mapping and Analytical Methodology.²⁰⁾NATO (2023) The NATO Greenhouse Gases Emission Mapping and Analytical Methodology, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/7/pdf/230710-NATO-GHG-Methodology.pdf. Accessed on 2 July 2025. It can also help inform investment decisions, drive innovation towards more energy-efficient technologies, and help amplify nations’ best practices²¹⁾NATO (2023) Climate Change and Security Action Plan – Compendium of Best Practice. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/7/pdf/0664-22_Climate_Change_Compendium_-_V3.pdf. Accessed on 1 July 2025 to improve energy efficiency at sea and reduce black-carbon soot. The recent addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO supports this agenda, as both nations are leaders in green energy and climate security, contributing valuable scientific and technological expertise to the Alliance.

Conclusion

Climate change in the Arctic maritime domain presents complex, interlinked challenges that span strategic, operational, and human security dimensions. Implementing NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan in the region requires adopting a holistic approach that considers the unique vulnerabilities of Arctic seas.Key avenues for action include: increasing Allied awareness of regional climate impacts by leveraging technology and mainstreaming the climate variable into Arctic wargaming; adapting naval capabilities, training and exercises to changing climate conditions, while valuing local and traditional knowledge; and promoting science and technology cooperation to help reduce NATO’s environmental footprint in Arctic seas. With the climate crisis accelerating with compound impacts on the region, and as the Alliance’s political context may become more polarized in the years ahead, NATO must continue to adapt, leveraging research in close coordination with Arctic nations – before the window of opportunity freezes over.

Pauline Baudu is the Director of the Climate and Security Programme at the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute based in Ottawa, a Senior Fellow with Arctic360, and a member of the NATO Research Task Group on the Effects of Climate Change on Security (SAS-182). She is also pursuing a PhD in Political Science at Université du Québec à Montréal.

Fabio Lissi is a graduate from the Italian Joint Staff College and a former Research Fellow of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE). He is currently serving on a temporary basis as Resource Officer in NATO International Staff – Operations Division.

This paper was first published in its original form by the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) in March 2024, as part of the conference proceedings²²⁾Carniel S, Russo A, Lissi F (2024) Climate Change and Security Workshop Proceedings, CMRE CP -2024-001, https://www.climatechangesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CMRE-CP-2024-001.pdf of the Climate Change and Security workshop organized by the CMRE on October 3-5, 2023 in Lerici, Italy. It has been revised and updated for the purpose of this series. Fabio Lissi would like to acknowledge the support and supervision received from all CMRE Research Division and administrative staff, and the funding from NATO Office of Chief Scientist.